Priorities for the EU’s New Foreign Policy Agenda up to 2024: Unleashing the Potential of the Common Foreign and Security Policy by Puglierin, Jana
www.ssoar.info
Priorities for the EU’s New Foreign Policy Agenda
up to 2024: Unleashing the Potential of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy
Puglierin, Jana
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Puglierin, J. (2019). Priorities for the EU’s New Foreign Policy Agenda up to 2024: Unleashing the Potential of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy. (DGAP Analysis, 1). Berlin: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für
Auswärtige Politik e.V.. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-66094-5
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
German Council on Foreign Relations
ANALYSIS
Priorities for the EU’s 
New Foreign Policy 
Agenda up to 2024
Unleashing the Potential  
of the Common Foreign and  
Security Policy
Given the changing international environment and mounting  
external challenges, taking practical steps toward a more effective 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) must become a top 
concern for the EU in its new political-institutional cycle.
 – The fresh start in Brussels in terms of personnel and setup offers 
an opportunity to revise CFSP’s priorities, as well as its concep-
tual and institutional framework.
 – Better realizing CFSP’s potential presupposes that member 
states are willing to subordinate their own national objectives to 
a common European goal and make the necessary compromises.
 – Practical measures to improve the CFSP’s effectiveness include 
exploiting the full potential of the treaties, ad hoc coalition 
building, and redefining the role the High Representative. 
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The changing international environment and mount-
ing external challenges have given new momentum 
to further developing the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). Promoting European interests 
and values on the global stage and increasing the EU’s 
capacity to act autonomously are among the main pri-
orities of the European Council’s new strategic agen-
da for 2019–2024. In it, the European Council commits 
to making more resources available and to better us-
ing those the EU already has at its disposal. The des-
ignated new European Commission President Ursu-
la von der Leyen also supports a “stronger Europe in 
the world” and wants to increase the Commission’s fo-
cus on external action. It is important that announce-
ments are now followed by actual deeds, but the con-
ditions remain difficult. 
At a time when, more than ever, the EU needs to 
act as a united international player in order not to 
become a pawn in the hands of major powers, the 
European member states are increasingly strug-
gling to find the energy and political will to set 
aside their disagreements and focus on the Euro-
pean common interest.
Looking back on the ten years since the Lisbon 
Treaty became effective illustrates how difficult it 
remains to find the necessary consensus and sup-
port for joint foreign policy action within the CFSP 
framework. The EU often had no adequate answers 
to foreign policy crises, and its influence on the in-
ternational system as a whole has declined.
The reasons that have so far prevented a proac-
tive and coherent European foreign policy are con-
nected to the nature of foreign policy as a core ele-
ment of national identity and sovereignty. They are 
also deeply rooted in the structural inconsistency 
of supranational and intergovernmental elements 
in CFSP governance. In sum, CFSP suffers from 
 - an ongoing lack of unity and consistency both 
between EU institutions and member states and 
between the member states’ national foreign 
policies;
 - the reluctance of member states to hand over sover-
eignty and powers to Brussels;
 - a lack of loyalty and (therefore) a lack of willingness 
to compromise;
 - the member states’ skepticism about the added value 
of the EU as a framework for foreign policy action;
 - a fragmentation of external competences.
Today, the number of foreign policy challenges has 
massively increased. Given the limited influence 
that even the largest European countries have rel-
ative to major powers like the US or China, the EU 
is the only instrument European states will be able 
to use to advance some – if not all – of their most 
important foreign policy objectives.
Although the list of foreign policy challenges for 
the EU is long, four crucial areas stand out because 
they shake the very foundations of European for-
eign policy. In these areas, Europeans have only two 
options: collective empowerment or autonomous 
decline. They are:
 - Protecting multilateralism in an increasingly 
national, unilateral world
 - Shoring up the transatlantic relationship
 - Dealing with a rising China
 - Catching up in the race for AI and new technologies
In order to create a more effective Common For-
eign and Security Policy, big institutional reforms, 
implying treaty changes, are currently not in the 
cards. Nor is it likely that member states will show 
an increased willingness to hand over significantly 
more sovereignty to Brussels.
There are, however, several good ways to further 
develop the CFSP governance structure in order to 
better enable the EU to address these challeng-
es and unleash the EU’s foreign policy potential. 
They are not mutually exclusive, but present dif-
ferent options that should be followed flexibly de-
pending on their prospect for success. In the end, 
the Union’s ability to act is less determined by the 
actors and parameters by which the CFSP will ul-
timately be further developed. Rather, it is more 
important for member states and institutions to 
speak with one voice and for the measures taken to 
strengthen, rather than undermine, the cohesion of 
the EU. This report presents the following practical 
instruments and methods that would improve the 
CFSP’s effectiveness and could be applied within 
the given operational framework. 
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by exploiting the full potential of the EU’s le-
gal framework: The Lisbon Treaty provides more 
scope for the Europeanization of foreign poli-
cy than is currently being used. While some of 
the treaty’s unused instruments could speed-up 
the decision-making process and would give ex-
ternal powers much less incentive to cultivate 
Trojan horses in the EU, the realization of this 
potential depends solely on the political will of the 
member states. When pushing for progress on the 
implementation of the treaty’s unused instruments, 
one should be careful not to dissuade more mem-
ber states from pursuing their common foreign pol-
icy interests through the EU legal framework. After 
all, qualified majority voting (QMV) or “constructive 
abstention” are not silver bullets for solving all of the 
CFSP’s problems in one fell swoop. 
Embrace the trend toward ad hoc coalitions en-
suring this does not weaken EU cohesion and dem-
ocratic legitimacy: In the coming years, European 
states might have to choose what is more import-
ant to them even more often: EU unity or the Eu-
ropean ability to act. It might well be that the lat-
ter cannot be achieved with all 27 member states 
(after Brexit). Some European member states may 
be even more willing to move ahead with a select-
ed group of like-minded partners that are ready to 
act together expediently. It is important to shape 
the coalitions in a way that does not undermine the 
cohesion of the EU-27. 
The involvement of EU officials, respect for smaller 
partners’ sensibilities, and an inclusive and trans-
parent approach are essential. The European Coun-
cil should focus much more on foreign policy issues 
than is currently the case, and its president, Charles 
Michel, should steer this debate in a strategic way. 
A good working method would be to discuss for-
eign policy objectives and strategy together in the 
European Council and then task a coalition of will-
ing-and-able member states with their implemen-
tation, offering incentives.
Apply the “Barnier method” to CFSP: Discussing 
how to create a stronger CFSP – one that is more 
than the extended arm of national foreign policies 
– presupposes that the member states are actual-
ly prepared to grant real leadership to an actor that 
speaks and acts on behalf of the EU.
The Brexit negotiations serve as a role model for 
how such an approach can be successfully imple-
mented, taking the interests of both the mem-
ber states and the institutions into account. While 
Michel Barnier was able to speak on behalf of the 
EU and his task force coordinated the Commission’s 
work on all strategic, operational, legal, and finan-
cial issues related to these negotiations, member 
states remained in the driver’s seat of the negoti-
ations at all times. This method could also be ap-
plied to foreign policy. 
Redefine the role of the High Representative (HR): 
Josep Borrell, the new designated HR, may be 
able to lend more energy and charisma to Euro-
pean foreign policy in the future. He has consider-
ably greater experience than his predecessor, Fed-
erica Mogherini, and is known for not shying away 
from conflict. Much will depend on Borrell’s good 
relationship with von der Leyen and Michel, as well 
as on his ability to obtain the trust of the member 
states. However, there should be realistic expecta-
tions from the outset since he will have only limit-
ed influence and shaping power.
In terms of work share, Borrell should be tasked 
with a clear mandate from the member states to 
actually lead some important foreign policy portfo-
lios and negotiate on behalf of the Union, as in the 
case of Mogherini and her predecessor Catherine 
Ashton with Iran. One of his first priorities should 
be to start working on a follow-up document that 
revises the EU Global Strategy, making sure that 
member states fully buy in this time around.
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THE NEED FOR A MORE 
ASSERTIVE COMMON FOREIGN 
AND SECURITY POLICY
The new leadership team in Brussels – President of 
the EU Commission Ursula von der Leyen, High Rep-
resentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Se-
curity Policy Josep Borrell, and European Coun-
cil President Charles Michel – will have to address 
an ambitious foreign policy agenda. The conditions 
for European foreign policy have changed radical-
ly in recent years. The EU currently finds itself in a 
world dominated by the rivalries of major powers, 
with a rising and ever more vigorous China, a revi-
sionist Russia, and a United States that endorses a 
transactional worldview while promoting “Ameri-
ca First.” The EU’s “business model,” based on mul-
tilateralism and the rules-based international order, 
is increasingly under pressure, even within Europe. 
Over the past decade, the EU’s effort to project this 
model outward has collapsed; its immediate neigh-
borhood has transformed from a circle of potential 
friends and partners into a ring of instability. 
These international developments have hit the EU at 
a time when it is absorbed by a multitude of crises at 
home. Many states are paralyzed by domestic chal-
lenges. After the 2008 financial crash and the sub-
sequent crisis in the Eurozone, followed by the huge 
2015 migrant influx, Europeans are deeply divided 
on essential political questions. There is little agree-
ment about which goals they want to pursue through 
European integration. At a time when, more than ev-
1 European External Action Service, The European Union’s Global Strategy: Three Years On, Looking Forward (June 13, 2019), p. 30 <https://eeas.europa.
eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_global_strategy_2019.pdf> (accessed August 30, 2019).
er, the EU needs to act as a united international play-
er in order not to become a pawn in the hands of 
the great powers, European member states are in-
creasingly struggling to find the energy and politi-
cal will to set aside their disagreements and focus on 
the European common interest. As a consequence, 
the EU has often had no adequate answers to foreign 
policy crises in recent years, and its influence on the 
international system as a whole has declined.
It is long past time for the EU to achieve more Eu-
ropean “strategic autonomy,” defined as the “ability 
to act, together with […] partners wherever possible, 
but alone when necessary.”1 So far, the debate about 
“strategic autonomy” and the attention of European 
foreign policy decision-makers and EU institutions 
has primarily focused on defense issues – not least 
because of how President Trump has pressured the 
Europeans to take on more of the military burden 
and deal with the multiple crises in Europe’s neigh-
borhood without America’s help. As a result, in the 
last three years, the EU has directed a lot of its ener-
gy toward strengthening the Common Security and 
Defense Policy (CSDP). In the process, it has achieved 
visible successes, notably the establishment of the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the 
European Defense Fund (EDF), whose purpose is to 
jointly develop European defense capabilities, in-
vest in shared projects, and enhance the operational 
readiness of armed forces. But while there has been 
some progress on European defense policy, the over-
arching diplomatic and foreign policy framework is 
still very much missing.
This paper therefore looks for ways to improve the 
EU’s ability to act in foreign and security policy. First, 
it takes stock of the state of CFSP ten years after the 
Treaty of Lisbon in order to shed light on the factors 
that have so far prevented a proactive and coherent 
European foreign policy that corresponds to the eco-
nomic and political weight of the Union. It then gives 
recommendations to member states and EU institu-
tions on the foreign policy areas the EU needs to pri-
oritize in the next institutional cycle. Finally, it iden-
tifies ways to reform current governance structures 
to take CFSP forward and make it more effective. 
THE NEED FOR A MORE ASSERTIVE 
COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY 
POLICY 4
TAKING STOCK OF CFSP TEN YEARS 
AFTER THE LISBON TREATY 5
PRIORITIES FOR EU FOREIGN POLICY 
2019–2024 7
HOW TO TAKE THE CFSP FORWARD: 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND 
INSTITUTIONAL SETUP 12
Priorities for the EU’s New Foreign Policy Agenda up to 2024
5No. 1 | November 2019
ANALYSE
TAKING STOCK OF CFSP TEN YEARS 
AFTER THE LISBON TREATY
The Treaty of Lisbon, which became effective in December 
2009, aimed to sustainably improve the coherence of the 
CFSP and enhance the EU’s ability to speak with one voice 
internationally. The idea was to delegate formal leadership 
functions – such as agenda-setting, coordination, and rep-
resentation – to Brussels by creating the European Exter-
nal Action Service (EEAS) and bolstering the position of 
the EU High Representative (HR), making the HR also the 
Vice-President of the Commission and head of the Europe-
an Defense Agency. The hope was that this would generate 
a new dynamic between the member states and EU insti-
tutions, with the overarching goal of more consistency and 
greater cohesion.2
A Mixed Track Record
To some extent, these changes have paid off. The EU has es-
tablished a densely institutionalized system of foreign poli-
cy consultation and cooperation in Brussels. Its foreign pol-
icy machinery now functions more efficiently and with less 
friction than before. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty has clear-
ly enhanced the range of instruments available for EU action 
in the field of CFSP. For smaller member states in particu-
lar, EU missions abroad often provide access and knowledge 
that would not otherwise be available. There has also been a 
legal evolution of the CFSP in recent years, and an increase 
in the number of EU restrictive measures (sanctions). Chris-
tophe Hillion, an expert on European law, rightly points out 
that the new European defense initiatives “seemingly in-
still a culture of obligation and monitoring in a policy ar-
ea whose hallmark has traditionally been their absence.”3 
Certainly, the CFSP has become less peripheral in the EU’s 
overall policy-making. However, in many areas, the CFSP 
still falls short. 
Although the Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the EU’s for-
eign policy machinery, Europe’s overall influence over the 
international system has been decreasing, and the EU has 
rarely succeeded in finding a quick and decisive common 
response to international challenges. The track record of 
the EU in crisis management over the past tumultuous de-
cade is mixed at best. 
The EU has done well to maintain agreement on the jointly 
imposed sanctions against Russia following the annexation 
of Crimea despite wavering from some member states. The 
sanctions remain in force to this day. The EU has also played 
a crucial role in mediating direct talks between Serbia and 
2 Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet and Carolin Rüger, Die Außenpolitik der EU (Berlin/Boston 2015), pp. 123–32.
3 Christophe Hillion, “Editorial Comments,” Common Market Law Review 55 (2018), pp. 3–4.
Kosovo (the “EU-facilitated dialogue”) aimed at normalizing 
relations between the two sides. The EU3 (Germany, France, 
and the UK, plus the High Representative) enabled the EU to 
play a fundamental role in negotiating the Iran nuclear deal 
– the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 
– which is unquestionably the EU’s signature foreign policy 
achievement of the last decade. 
However, these successes are the exception rather than the 
rule, and some will probably be short lived. The dialogue be-
tween Serbia and Kosovo has stalled since 2016, and the EU 
has not managed to restart negotiations despite several at-
tempts. And it is still unclear whether the EU can count-
er the Trump administration’s strategy of “maximum pres-
sure” on Iran and save the JCPOA. Unfortunately, the odds 
are not very good.
On the debit side of the Union’s foreign policy balance sheet 
is certainly the total helplessness with which the EU re-
acted to the Arab uprisings after 2011. The EU has had very 
little presence in the Middle East. It has been largely ab-
sent in Syria, which is, after all, the biggest crisis hotspot in 
its southern neighborhood and poses an enormous threat 
to the stability of the EU – in particular, through the large 
number of refugees leaving for Europe. In Libya, the EU has 
so far been unable to tackle the post-revolutionary chaos 
after NATO’s intervention in 2011. Here, for some time now, 
the EU’s most engaged member states – France and Italy – 
have preferred to torpedo each other’s Libya policies rather 
than set aside their differences and seek a united European 
position. The fact is that the EU neither had the means nor 
the political will to play a decisive role in managing most of 
the foreign and security crises of the last ten years, not even 
in its own neighborhood.
 The JCPOA is the EU’s  
foreign policy achievement 
of the last decade
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Reasons for the EU’s Lack of Ability to Act
In sum, CFSP suffers from 
 - an ongoing lack of unity and consistency both 
between EU institutions and member states and 
between the member states’ national foreign policies;
 - the reluctance of member states to hand over sover-
eignty and powers to Brussels;
 - a lack of loyalty and (therefore) a lack of willingness 
to compromise;
 - the member states’ skepticism about the added value 
of the EU as a framework for foreign policy action;
 - a fragmentation of external competences.
EU foreign policy remains a prerogative of the na-
tion-states: Despite the “Brusselization” of the CFSP, 
the EU’s foreign policy machinery remains detached 
from actual decision-making, which is still intergov-
ernmental and based on unanimity. Consequently, all 
major strategic decisions in CFSP continue to be tak-
en at the level of the heads of state and government: 
in the European Council. CFSP is often little more 
than an expression of the “lowest common denom-
inator” of diverging interests.
Furthermore, EU institutions still lack the power to 
prevent member states from pursuing their own in-
dependent foreign policies, which they are running 
in parallel to that of the Union, and which are shaped 
by their different geopolitical interests, threat as-
sessments, socioeconomic aims, and historical tra-
jectories. Over the past ten years, divergent national 
points of view have frequently led to an uncoordi-
nated cacophony instead of a common EU position. 
Although member states are obliged by the Lisbon 
Treaty to cooperate and coordinate their policies in 
order to achieve a higher degree of coherence in Eu-
ropean foreign policy, this principle of loyal coop-
eration is de facto unenforceable. Member states’ 
4 This was a key takeaway from our workshop in Berlin.
5 For further reading, see Lisbeth Aggestam and Federica Bicchi, “New Directions in EU Foreign Policy Governance: Cross-loading, Leadership and 
actions are only constrained by their sense of loyal-
ty. If a single member state decides to break ranks 
and ignore a position that had previously been joint-
ly agreed, the EU is a helpless bystander. This has pre-
vented the EU from expressing a unified position in 
many critical cases, as the failure to adopt joint state-
ments on China, Venezuela, or the INF Treaty has 
demonstrated. 
The unanimity principle in European foreign poli-
cy has not only stalled or hampered the EU’s deci-
sion-making process in the last decade, but it has 
also offered an incentive for foreign powers to cul-
tivate Trojan horses among the EU member states, 
through which they are able to influence decisions 
or block them altogether. 
CFSP is moving in circles: The CFSP is trapped in 
a vicious circle. On the one hand, Brussels institu-
tions do not have the necessary power to success-
fully shape foreign policy because the member states 
do not want to give up crucial competences and sov-
ereignty. Member states have twice appointed rela-
tively low-profile figures who had little experience 
for the post of European foreign policy chief – Cath-
erine Ashton and Federica Mogherini as HRs. These 
appointments can be explained by the unwillingness 
of the member states to underpin the strengthened 
position of the High Representative with a politi-
cal heavyweight. It is therefore no surprise that, like 
Ashton before her, Mogherini has remained relatively 
pale in office, especially when compared to the for-
mer “Mr. CFSP” Javier Solana. 
Many member states, in turn, doubt whether the 
post-Lisbon institutional setup has led to more ef-
ficiency and question the usefulness of the HR and 
the added value of the EEAS, making them even more 
reluctant to give up further competences and em-
power Brussels.4 But if member states do not dele-
gate competences to EU institutions and trust the 
HR and the EEAS more, these Brussels organizations 
will never be able to prove that they are better posi-
tioned to address collective problems than the mem-
ber states.
Member states often do not see the added value of 
working through CFSP: Recent years have shown 
that member states often choose informal ways to 
cooperate on a minilateral basis, rather than use the 
formal institutional structures and procedures of the 
CFSP.5 For member states, the added value of work-
Many doubt whether the 
post-Lisbon setup has led 
to more efficiency
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ing through the CFSP framework has to be consid-
erable to justify the hurdles. Firstly, since decisions 
have to be taken by consensus, the decision-making 
process is more cumbersome and much slower. 
Secondly, in the minds of national decision-mak-
ers, domestic political considerations carry a lot of 
weight. As Euroskeptic parties have risen through-
out Europe, their skepticism toward “Brussels” has 
also found its way into the foreign policy discourses 
of the European member states. This makes it harder 
for national decision-makers to argue for the benefit 
of working through EU structures and to get public 
support – especially because the EU has so few for-
eign policy success stories to show, and political le-
gitimacy is anchored at the national level. 
After having made an evaluation of the relative effec-
tiveness – and political expediency – of the various 
means at their disposal, member states have often 
preferred to make foreign policy initiatives on their 
own or in small, informal coalitions – even though 
they could have submitted initiatives directly to the 
Council to get the EU to take action. This trend in-
creases the risk that the EU framework will become 
arbitrarily interchangeable and that member states 
will start to look at the EU as just another one of the 
multilateral forums where they pursue their nation-
al foreign policy goals. What’s more, it weakens the 
sense of loyalty that is supposed to discourage mem-
ber states from going it alone at a national level. 
On the other hand, the establishment of an informal 
coalition of states was often the only possible way to 
address specific policy issues at all, such as when the 
EU – through its formal institutions or legal frame-
work – was unable or unwilling to take action. In its 
December 12, 2018, resolution on the annual report 
on the implementation of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, the European Parliament acknowl-
edged that ad hoc coalitions of member states “could 
render EU external action more flexible and respon-
sive in the short term in addressing changing situa-
tions, by reducing the pressure of having to achieve 
universal consensus among the member states.”6
EU’s external action is fragmented: An additional 
structural problem is that the CFSP is only one part 
of the EU’s external relations. The whole spectrum 
of EU external action goes far beyond the CFSP and 
includes trade and development policy, humanitar-
Informal Groupings,” Journal of Common Market Studies 57, no. 3 (2019), pp. 515–32.
6 European Parliament resolution of December 12, 2018, on the annual report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(2018/2097(INI)) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0513_EN.html> (accessed August 30, 2019).
ian aid, enlargement, and neighborhood policy, as 
well as external aspects of migration or environmen-
tal policy. While the CFSP continues to be decided by 
the member states, the other areas are largely with-
in the competence of the Commission. Even though 
the Lisbon Treaty tasks the High Representative, 
in his secondary capacity as Vice-President of the 
Commission, to ensure a certain coherence, there 
remains a lack of coordination between him, the 
member states, and the Commissioners in dealing 
with external competences. The EU Global Strategy 
(EUGS) recognizes this predicament and calls for a 
more “joined up Union” and an integrated approach, 
highlighting that more cooperation among the EE-
AS, the other institutions, and the member states is 
needed. However, work still needs to be done, espe-
cially since some of the most pressing foreign poli-
cy challenges include areas not strictly within CFSP 
– like trade wars, emerging technologies, or climate 
change.
PRIORITIES FOR EU FOREIGN 
POLICY 2019–2024
The ten years since Lisbon have shown how difficult 
it still is to find the necessary consensus, political 
will, and support for joint foreign policy action with-
in the CFSP framework. 
However, given the massive increase of foreign pol-
icy challenges and the limited influence that even 
the largest European countries have relative to ma-
jor powers like the US or China, the EU is the on-
ly instrument through which European states will be 
able to advance some of their most important for-
eign policy objectives. The list of foreign policy issues 
that the EU needs to tackle is long, including a better 
neighborhood policy and climate change. 
Nevertheless, four crucial areas stand out because 
they shake the very foundations of European for-
eign policy. If European leaders do not manage to 
come up with a strong collective response in these 
crucial policy areas, they will not be able to shape 
many other related policy areas according to their 
preferences. 
Priorities for the EU’s New Foreign Policy Agenda up to 2024
8 No. 1 | November 2019
ANALYSE
In these areas, Europeans have only two options: col-
lective empowerment or autonomous decline.7 The 
four crucial policy areas are:
 - Protecting multilateralism in an increasingly 
national, unilateral world
 - Shoring up the transatlantic relationship
 - Dealing with a rising China
 - Catching up in the race for AI and new technologies
Protecting Multilateralism in an Increasingly 
National, Unilateral World: Dealing with great-pow-
er politics as a driving force for international cooper-
ation: As a primarily “civilian power” that is reluctant 
to use military means and emphasizes soft power, 
multilateralism, and legal solutions, the EU was not 
designed to pursue great-power politics. It therefore 
lacks not only the mindset, but also the necessary 
tools and instruments – first and foremost, military 
capabilities. The founding concept of the EU is the 
idea that the results of international cooperation are 
divisible, that international politics is not about who 
benefits most, but about everyone being better off 
when cooperating with each other. This means that 
the EU is currently not in line with the trend of the 
times. While the EU has thought of itself as an ex-
port model that would shape its neighborhood in its 
own image, it must now come to terms with the fact 
that it does not necessarily embody the most com-
pelling idea of what the world will be like. Instead, 
the EU must adapt to things it thought would never 
happen. It needs to develop a strategy to defend its 
interests more robustly and to become more resil-
ient so as not to turn into an anachronism. 
7 This expression was coined by Anand Menon, “Divided and Declining? Europe in a Changing World,” Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. S1 
(September 2014), p. 16.
8 Nathalie Tocci, “The making of the EU Global Strategy,” Contemporary Security Policy 37, no. 3 (2016), p. 464.
9 Sven Biscop, “The EU Global Strategy,” Egmont Security Policy Brief (March 2019), p. 3 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2019/03/
SPB108.pdf?type=pdf> (accessed August 30, 2019).
The 2016 EU Global Strategy took into account that 
the world had become more contested and conflict-
ual.8 The document focused on stability and “princi-
pled pragmatism” rather than on transformation. But 
it remained vague about what resilience means in 
practice, how it can be made operational, and what 
resources it takes.9 Written before the Brexit ref-
erendum in the UK and Donald Trump’s election as 
American President, the GS’s strategic assessment is 
still very much a reflection of the Obama years. 
One of the next High Representative’s first priori-
ties, therefore, should be to start making revisions 
to a follow-up document, making sure that member 
states fully buy in this time around. Such a revised 
strategy must, in particular, outline the EU’s com-
mon approach toward the growing rivalry between 
the United States and China, as well as the further 
erosion of multilateralism and the rules-based in-
ternational order. In the course of the writing pro-
cess, the HR should initiate a debate among member 
states to jointly define the controversial term “stra-
tegic autonomy,” setting a concrete level of ambition 
for what the EU wants to be able to do on its own 
on the global stage in areas such as defense, trade, 
or technology. Additionally, the concept of resilience 
needs to be further operationalized. 
Of course, mapping out such a strategy is not 
enough. The EU needs to enhance its ability to im-
plement it. First and foremost, the EU needs to in-
vest more in its ability to provide for its own defense, 
security, and prosperity. The diplomatic and eco-
nomic potential of the EU can only be fully exploit-
ed if the EU is able to back it up – with adequate mil-
itary means if necessary. 
Championing multilateralism as an anchor point 
for like-minded actors: As unsettling and threatening 
as it is, the shift toward nationalism and unilateralism 
can be an opportunity for the EU if it manages to turn 
its supposed weakness into a virtue and adopts an an-
ti-cyclical approach. If the EU develops the ability, 
tools, instruments, and resources to single itself out 
as the one champion of the rules-based international 
order and sticks to its commitment to multilateralism 
and international cooperation, it will become an even 
more attractive partner for other like-minded actors 
The new HR should initiate 
a debate to define the EU’s 
“strategic autonomy”
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like Japan, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, or South 
Korea, as well as others who feel the need to main-
tain the multilateral system and seek predictable and 
stable cooperation. The EU should continue to pro-
actively look for those partners, especially because 
the US’s turn toward protectionism has made the EU 
even more attractive in this regard. The recent trade 
agreements between the EU and Japan and the EU 
and Mercosur are a proof of this. 
The European Policy Center’s Giovanni Grevi nails it 
by stating that “in a context marked by the revival of 
nationalism and power politics, a rules-based Union 
of states and peoples seeking to establish rules-
based international cooperation is a public good.”10 
The EU’s core strength is its regulatory power. Grevi 
suggests that the EU needs to understand how to 
better leverage this power by connecting internal 
policies and assets to external instruments and ob-
jectives. For example, the EU should seek to establish 
a level playing field for the application of emerging 
technologies in Europe as a step to shaping related 
multilateral regimes.11
In meetings at multilateral institutions, Europeans 
should put cross-border topics for which more coop-
eration is in the interest of many other countries on 
the agenda – for example, the free use of the glob-
al commons, trade, and climate. In those policy ar-
eas, it can draw on its understanding and experience 
of network agency and proactively engage partners, 
including non-state actors that share the EU’s inter-
est. It should contribute to the reform of internation-
al organizations like the WTO in order to ensure im-
proved cooperation. And instead of giving up on its 
soft power, it should double-down on it, for exam-
ple, by making better use of science diplomacy. After 
all, the EU remains an integration project of unprece-
dented success. It has proven to be much more resil-
ient than many have thought. Its power of attraction 
– which stems from the peace, prosperity, and de-
mocracy it has provided for its citizens – endures de-
spite the odds. To maintain this power, the EU needs 
to avoid the further erosion of shared norms and val-
ues. The EU can only credibly support a rules-based 
order around it by ensuring its continuity at home 
and by finding more effective ways to sanction viola-
tions of the rule of law by member states.
10 Giovanni Grevi, “Rules first: The way forward for ‘shaping power’ Europe,” Challenge Europe: Yes, we should! EU priorities for 2019–2024, European 
Policy Centre, Issue 24 (April 2019), p. 95.
11 For a further outline of this argument, see Grevi ibid. 
Shoring up the Transatlantic Relationship
Bracing for a widening rift in transatlantic relations: 
It has become almost a platitude to state that the 
main feature of the Trump presidency is uncertain-
ty, but that doesn’t make it any less true. Ambiguity 
in US foreign policy and relations with American al-
lies is likely to persist as long as Donald Trump re-
mains in office. However, another factor has been a 
constant since Trump’s inauguration: the American 
president is very skeptical of, if not hostile to, the EU. 
Other American presidents have also taken the Eu-
ropean allies to task or been wary of the EU as an in-
stitution, but Trump is the first one to see the EU 
as a “foe,” set up to take advantage of the US. As the 
2020 presidential campaign picks up speed, Trump’s 
rhetoric toward his European allies will probably get 
even sharper as he seeks to fire up his base. Euro-
peans might become subject to further tariffs, which 
will be a major blow to their economies. 
Another feature of the Trump presidency is that he 
makes linkages between trade and security and puts 
everything on the table as leverage. He values Amer-
ican allies only to the extent that they enhance the 
US’s strategic position, rendering transatlantic re-
lations more transactional. This is a huge challenge 
for the EU, particularly because Europeans have out-
sourced most of their security and defense policy 
to the US and are therefore dependent on Ameri-
can security guarantees, at least in the short to me-
dium term. This dependency hugely hampers the EU 
member states’ readiness to rally behind the Euro-
pean flag in order to counter Trump’s foreign policy 
since they often don’t want to endanger their bilat-
eral relationship with the US. The Trump administra-
tion’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and the threat
Strong transatlantic  
relations remain vital 
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 of secondary sanctions on European companies has 
furthermore shown that the EU immediately loses 
influence and the ability to shape events, also in the 
economic sphere, when the US decides to torpedo 
European foreign policy goals. 
It is too early to predict the outcome of the 2020 US 
presidential election; and it is still unclear whether a 
Democratic president would again seek a more tra-
ditional foreign policy with deep engagement in Eu-
rope. But America’s role as global hegemon – in other 
words, as a provider of public goods – was ques-
tioned not only by Trump but also by his predeces-
sor, Barack Obama. In particular, there is no longer 
unquestioning support for the idea that globaliza-
tion, free trade, and multilateral institutions are ben-
eficial to the United States – and economic interde-
pendence is now also seen by many Democrats as a 
weakness rather than a strength of the United States. 
Even back in 2011, when President Obama announced 
his “Pivot to Asia,” it became clear that the US was 
increasingly focusing on Asia and the Pacific. While 
the Ukraine crisis brought America’s attention back 
to Europe, in the next five years, the US will increas-
ingly turn from being a “European power” to “a pow-
er in Europe.” 
Strong transatlantic relations remain vital for the EU. 
Any attempt to cut loose would immediately under-
mine Europe’s security and split the Europeans – be-
cause cracks in transatlantic relations are also always 
intra-European cracks. On the other hand, Europe-
ans can no longer expect the US to take the lion’s 
share of the defense burden in Europe and its pe-
riphery. EU member states and EU institutions must 
therefore invest heavily in the transatlantic relation-
ship, while at the same time trying to hedge against 
the attacks of the Trump administration. This re-
quires a diplomatic balancing act, the aim of which 
must be to remain transatlantic and at the same time 
become more European. Not all of the criticism of 
Europe coming from the Trump administration is 
unjustified: Europeans definitely need to invest more 
in their own defense, in an EU framework, as well as 
in NATO, and they must stick to the commitments 
they have made. As the EU further develops its de-
fense initiatives, it should look for possibilities for 
Washington to plug into some of the initiatives in a 
way that is beneficial for both sides. 
What is more, Europeans should look beyond the 
Trump administration and try to engage with oth-
er important actors. EU institutions and member 
states should intensify dialogue at all levels with the 
US Congress, governors, and US civil society in the 
coming years to ensure that transatlantic relations 
remain vital and a renewed partnership is possible 
after Trump. The EU should also continue to seek a 
trade agreement with the US despite the odds. 
Trump as a push factor: Trump is not the first US 
president to convey the message that Europeans 
need to do more, but he is by far the most vigor-
ous. He makes the Europeans feel the negative con-
sequences of their dependence on America. With 
America pulling back and expecting more from its al-
lies, a more capable, active, and sovereign EU in se-
curity, trade, and global diplomacy is no longer a 
“nice to have,” but a question of survival. Some ar-
gue that Trump is exactly the wake-up call the EU 
has needed in order to develop a sense of urgency. 
In that sense, Trump is a challenge, but also an op-
portunity: after all, Europeans are not only objects 
of Trump’s policy choices. They really can determine 
their own destiny. Europeans would benefit most 
from living in a world where the EU was more unified 
and capable of action on the foreign policy front. But 
the existence of a more capable EU would likewise 
enhance the attractiveness of Europeans as Ameri-
can allies. Therefore, Europeans should seize the ac-
tual crisis in transatlantic relations to push for fur-
ther alignment, coordination, and integration of their 
foreign and defense policy. 
Dealing with a Rising China
Avoiding becoming a ping-pong ball in the growing 
rivalry between Washington and Beijing: Regard-
less of who wins the US presidential election in 2020, 
the rivalry between the United States and China is 
here to stay and is expected to become even more 
intense. Both the US and China will increasingly see 
relations with Europe through the prism of this ri-
valry. They will continue to put pressure on individ-
ual member states to take sides on issues such as 5G 
telecommunications infrastructure and to support 
their respective agendas. Both actors are pursuing 
a tactic of emphasizing bilateral relations over deal-
ing with the EU’s multilateral structures. The Union 
needs to make sure that it does not allow the US 
or China to pit various parts of the EU against one 
another. 
In terms of substance, the EU and its member states 
increasingly share most of the US’s concerns with 
China, such as its trade policy – especially subsi-
dies and forced technology transfers – and its mil-
itary build-up and destabilizing policies in Asia, as 
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well as the further promotion of its authoritarian 
model in the rest of the world. China actively seeks 
to influence European politics through initiatives 
like the 17+1 format and the acquisition of critical in-
frastructure in EU member states. On several occa-
sions, it has successfully applied a strategy of “divide 
and conquer,” splitting the Europeans on issues like 
human rights. Through the Belt and Road Initiative 
and economic investments in the Western Balkans, 
it has gained a much bigger footprint in the EU’s 
neighborhood.
While only a few years ago there was great hope in 
the EU that China would continue to open up and 
ultimately become a Western-style market econ-
omy, Europeans are now increasingly aware of the 
pitfalls of their dependence on it. The tone toward 
China has become considerably rougher, and a par-
adigm shift is emerging in the EU, as evidenced by 
the disagreements at the joint EU-China summit in 
April 2019 and the new framework plan for Europe-
an investment screening. In 5G infrastructure, EU 
members have not yet completely denied access to 
Chinese companies, having only introduced a mix 
of smaller and larger restrictions and security mea-
sures, but the debate is intensifying. China is no lon-
ger seen merely as a cooperation partner but, simul-
taneously, as an economic competitor and systemic 
rival pursuing alternative models of order. The litmus 
test will be whether the EU will be able to translate 
this into a genuine hard-nosed policy based on reci-
procity, fairness, and clear demands.12
This is difficult because member states are still a 
long way from having a unified China policy. In bilat-
eral contexts, they often show no real willingness to 
put Europe first, mostly competing for China’s favor 
and seeking good economic relations. They see Chi-
na as a source of economic growth, an export mar-
ket, and an investor. Europe’s overriding strategic in-
terest is often secondary. 
12 For more background on the EU and China see Stormy-Annika  Mildner and Claudia Schmucker, “Making America Great Again versus Made in China: The 
US Geo-Economic Rivalry with China,” DGAPanalyse No. 2 (June 2019).
However, it is absolutely essential that the politi-
cal consensus in the EU on its own strategic inter-
ests with regard to China be further developed in the 
coming years. The initiative for this must come from 
the member states, but the institutions in Brussels 
should support them at every level.
Strengthening EU-US cooperation on China: In 
terms of interests and values, Europeans continue to 
have much more in common with the US than with 
China. China might continue to position itself as a 
defender of the international order and multilateral-
ism, but it wants to get rid of this order’s liberal ba-
sis: democracy, human rights, and market capitalism. 
Their different approaches toward China notwith-
standing, the EU and the US should take the China 
challenge as an opportunity to align their strategies. 
Cooperating in this regard would make the trans-
atlantic relationship more valuable, especially from 
an American perspective. Rather than imitating the 
US’s zero-sum thinking, the EU should try to chan-
nel shared US grievances with Chinese trade policies 
toward multilateral solutions whenever possible, de-
spite the current administration’s skeptical view of 
multilateralism.
This does not mean that the Europeans should sub-
ordinate their interests and principles to the Trump 
administration. There are distinct differences be-
tween the American and European approaches to 
China, and the Europeans should make clear that 
they are not extended instruments of US external 
policy. However, the transatlantic partners have so 
many shared interests regarding China that the EU 
can often pursue its own goals and please the Amer-
icans at the same time. In addition to their shared 
concerns about Chinese trade policy, Brussels and 
Washington both have an interest in upholding in-
ternational law in the South China Sea, for example. 
For this reason, member states should make greater 
efforts than in the past to develop points of contact 
and common policies with the US. In a G2 world, it’s 
not only the Europeans who need a strong partner. 
It’s the United States, too. 
The tone towards China 
has become rougher
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Catching up in the Race for AI and New Technologies
Avoiding permanent dependence on the great 
digital powers: In order to better assert itself against 
both China and the US, the EU must enhance its 
competitiveness in the race for emerging technol-
ogies such as artificial intelligence (AI)13. Both the 
US and China are “AI superpowers” that possess the 
main resources and structures needed to develop 
and boost AI services. Conversely, Europe still needs 
to provide the foundation for its firms and research-
ers to be competitive at the highest level. Time is 
short, and there is a great risk that Europe will be 
driven into permanent dependence on the great dig-
ital powers. There are three reasons why Europe is 
currently losing the AI race. 
First, Europe lacks the big sets of data that are es-
sential to get AI systems to work. The US, with its 
big tech companies (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Ap-
ple, and, to some extent, even IBM), is well-placed in 
this respect. China has an even larger data pool due 
to the sheer size of its population and the rigorous 
state-driven collection of its citizens’ data. Further-
more, it can also boast big tech companies (Tencent, 
Alibaba, Baidu) that possess mountains of data. In 
contrast, Europe lacks “domestic champions” in the 
tech industry, and its data pool is much more limited 
and fragmented. Its regulatory framework impedes 
the expensive gathering of available data. 
Second, the US and China are miles ahead in terms 
of their AI-related industry and startup scene. Sil-
icon Valley is still the main innovation hub for AI-
linked breakthroughs, while China is catching up at 
a rapid pace with its “military-civil fusion” model and 
task-specific startups (for example, SenseTime for fa-
cial recognition). The presence of those big tech com-
panies, which can quickly test and apply AI prototypes 
in practice, also helps startups in the US and China. 
Europe does boast certain sophisticated AI startups, 
but they are not supported by the necessary venture 
capital (US) or state investments (China).
Third, AI talents and experts have become a precious 
global commodity, one that Europe is struggling to 
obtain. American and Chinese firms are using a va-
riety of means to attract these talents, whereas Eu-
rope has to find mechanisms to maintain its already 
limited talent pool.
13 These sections benefitted greatly from my DGAP colleague Kaan Sahin’s insights and suggestions. For further reading see also Ulrike Franke, 
“Harnessing Artificial Intelligence,” ECFR Policy Brief (June, 2019) <https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/3_Harnessing_artificial_intelligence.pdf> (Accessed August 
30, 2019).
Catching up in New Tech, the European Way: In the 
face of these structural disadvantages, Europe has to 
find a way to be a player in the race for new technol-
ogies. Europe has a competitive advantage as a regu-
latory superpower and can set standards and regula-
tions for the world. With its 500 million consumers, 
it still has the leverage to force big tech companies 
to comply with the European rules – European da-
ta protection (GDPR) and privacy rules being the best 
examples. Nevertheless, effective regulation alone 
will not promote the emergence of the next Google 
or a groundbreaking standard. Here, the CFSP is to 
some extent reliant on other EU policy fields, like re-
search and education. As the single market is com-
pleted, Europe should also be able to reap advan-
tages from a larger potential source of data, a bigger 
pool of AI experts, and a more developed Europe-
an venture capital scene. The EU should think about 
what practices it could adopt from the US, or even 
China, without giving up its values.
HOW TO TAKE THE CFSP FORWARD: 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
AND INSTITUTIONAL SETUP
There are several good ways to further develop the 
CFSP governance structure in order to better en-
able the EU to address the aforementioned challeng-
es and to unleash the EU’s foreign policy potential. 
They are not mutually exclusive, but present differ-
ent options that could be used flexibly depending on 
what is most likely to be implemented. The Union’s 
ability to act is less determined by the actors and pa-
rameters by which the CFSP will ultimately be fur-
ther developed. Rather, it is more important for ev-
eryone to speak with one voice and for the measures 
to strengthen rather than undermine the cohesion 
of the EU. The following practical instruments and 
methods that would improve CFSP’s effectiveness 
Europe is currently  
losing the AI race
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and could be applied within the given operational 
framework:
 - Focus on strengthening European foreign pol-
icy interests through the EU’s legal framework, 
exploiting the full potential of the Lisbon Treaty 
and utilizing more of its “sleeping beauty” provi-
sions that have so far been untapped.
 - Embrace the existing trend toward ad hoc coali-
tions in European foreign policy and ensure that 
this doesnot weaken EU cohesion and democratic 
legitimacy.
 - Take Brexit negotiations as a blueprint for the CFSP.
 - Redefine the role of the High Representativez 
 
 
Focus on Strengthening Foreign Policy Interests 
through the EU’s Legal Framework
The Lisbon Treaty provides more scope for the 
Europeanization of foreign policy than is currently 
being used. The need to make better use of the trea-
ty’s instruments and tools has been an increasingly 
important topic of discussion in recent years. 
Qualified Majority Voting: The cases in which one 
member state has prevented a common foreign policy 
position of the EU and blocked the wishes of 26 oth-
ers have made the shortcomings of the EU’s unanimi-
ty principle in CFSP decision-making increasingly ob-
vious. This has led to a new push by several member 
states and the president of the European Commis-
sion, Jean-Claude Juncker, to move from unanimity to 
qualified majority voting (QMV) in certain areas of the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.14 
The advantages of QMV are obvious. QMV would 
give much less incentive to external powers to cul-
tivate Trojan horses in the EU and apply a strategy 
of “divide-and-conquer.” Rather than actually impos-
ing a decision on member states – after all, Article 31 
(2) TEU foresees an “emergency brake” that allows a 
member state to object to a decision being taken by a 
qualified majority for “vital and stated reasons of na-
tional policy” – the procedure would be instrumental 
in persuading them to compromise in order to build 
14 Art. 31 (2) of the TEU already allows QMV in four exceptional, rather limited, cases, but none of these exceptions has been used in practice so far. 
Additionally, the so-called “passerelle clause” (Art. 31 (3) of the TEU) enables the European Council to extend the use of QMV by unanimously adopting 
a decision “stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 2,” with the exception of those 
decisions having military or defense implications. In September 2018, the Commission proposed three specific areas where QMV could be implemented 
in accordance with the passerelle clause “to ensure that the EU better promotes its values globally, defends its interests, and takes swift decisions to: (1) 
respond collectively to attacks on human rights, (2) apply effective sanctions, and (3) launch and manage civilian security and defense missions.” See the 
press release of the European Commission on September 12, 2018, on the “State of the Union 2018: Making the EU a stronger global actor – European 
Commission proposes more efficient decision-making in Common Foreign and Security Policy,” <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-5683_en.htm> 
(accessed August 30, 2019).
15 For more background on QMV in CFSP, see  Leonard Schuette, “Should the EU make foreign policy decisions by majority voting?”, CER Policy Brief (May 
15, 2019) <https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pbrief_qmv_15.5.19_1.pdf> (accessed August 30, 2019).
consensus. At the moment, turning down or block-
ing common EU positions comes at a very low cost 
for individual member states. If there were a risk of 
being outvoted, the costs for the state concerned 
would increase significantly. If QMV were used more 
often, member states would hopefully seek to bring 
their objections into the decision-making process 
constructively, rather than simply vetoing decisions.
But even though the Commission has gotten pub-
lic support from some big member states, including 
Germany, many still oppose any extension of QMV to 
foreign policy. Small member states in particular fear 
being constantly outvoted by bigger member states 
with greater voting power.15 There is still a lot of re-
sistance to overcome, and the current climate in the 
EU does not call for more integration. Furthermore, 
strengthening the decision-making capacity of the 
EU by QMV could weaken the democratic legitimacy 
and weight of the decisions taken. Both are greater if 
the decision is clearly unanimous. Another danger of 
QMV is that it can lead to deepening rifts inside the 
EU, as became particularly obvious during the migra-
tion crisis, when QMV led to the biggest internal split 
in recent EU history. 
Certainly, QMV is no silver bullet to quickly fix 
CFSP shortcomings. In general, QMV can only be ap-
plied to a very limited number of decisions. Most is-
sues are decided by member states through “soft 
law,” or the “open method of coordination.” Here the 
principle of unanimity would continue to apply. It is 
therefore time to take the hysteria out of the debate 
and see QMV for what it really is: a useful tool that 
can accelerate decision-making in some areas, but 
certainly only a small building block on the road to 
making CFSP more coherent and assertive. On bal-
ance, increasing the use of majority voting would be 
the right move. Mogherini remained skeptical of the 
added value of QMV. Her successor should become 
an active supporter. 
Constructive abstention mechanism: Another key 
provision is Article 31 (1) TEU. This allows a member 
state to abstain on a vote in the field of CFSP and 
to declare that it will not apply a decision, while ac-
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cepting that the decision commits the Union. 
In the spirit of mutual solidarity, the article 
calls upon the abstaining member state “to 
refrain from any action likely to conflict with 
or impede Union action based on that deci-
sion.” However, this constructive abstention 
mechanism has so far been used only once, 
in February 2008, when Cyprus abstained 
from adopting a Council Joint Action estab-
lishing the EULEX Kosovo mission. Neverthe-
less, it provides a useful tool to prevent CFSP 
decision-making from being blocked, and the 
High Representative should more readily sug-
gest it in the future.16 Consideration should 
also be given to ways of applying constructive 
abstention to “soft law.” 
Enhanced cooperation: The Treaty of Lisbon 
offers the possibility of multiple speeds in Eu-
ropean foreign policy through “enhanced co-
operation,” which enables a bloc of states to 
deepen its cooperation at their own chosen 
pace. However, “enhanced cooperation” needs 
to involve a minimum of nine member states, 
and it can only be used as a means of “last re-
sort” after the Council has stated that the ob-
jectives of the cooperation cannot be attained 
within a reasonable period by the Union as a 
whole. Consequently, “enhanced coopera-
tion” is another mechanism that has never 
been used; member states are deterred by the 
strings attached. The activation of the Perma-
nent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), anoth-
er Lisbon instrument for differentiated inte-
gration, but limited to CSDP, remains a unique 
exception. Member states will likely continue 
to shy away from resorting to these possibili-
ties of differentiated integration, despite their 
provision in the Lisbon Treaty, because they 
do not want to see a “Europe of two classes” 
formalized.
16 See also Steven Blockmans, “Differentiation in CFSP: Potentials and Limits,” Istituto Affari Internazionali (March 2017), p. 5 <https://
www.iai.it/sites/default/files/eu60_5.pdf> (accessed August 30, 2019).
In sum, several mechanisms to introduce 
more f lexibility have remained largely un-
derused. Whether their potential will be bet-
ter exploited in the next political-institution-
al cycle depends solely on the political will of 
the member states. When pushing for prog-
ress on the implementation of all of these in-
struments, one needs to be careful not to 
dissuade more member states from pursu-
ing their common foreign policy interests 
through the EU legal framework. 
Europeanize Ad Hoc Coalitions
Stretching the Treaty of Lisbon to its limits 
can play an important role, but it will not be 
enough to rely solely on waking its “sleeping 
beauties.” In the coming years, European states 
might have to choose what is more important 
to them even more often: EU unity or the Eu-
ropean ability to act. It might well be that the 
latter cannot be achieved with all 27 member 
states (after Brexit). After all, foreign policy 
challenges cannot wait until the EU has sort-
ed out its internal disputes on the US or Chi-
na. National governments may be forced to put 
the achievable ahead of the aspirational. 
The logical conclusion is that some European 
member states may want to move ahead with 
a selected group of like-minded partners that 
are ready to act together more expediently. As 
long as it continues to be more attractive for 
member states to opt for common action out-
side the legal framework of the Union in order 
to avoid legal or practical constraints, they 
will continue to do so. 
States that want to promote CFSP should 
therefore focus on building coalitions of 
smaller groups of states to take over foreign 
policy portfolios and seek ways to make this 
beneficial for the Union’s overall foreign poli-
cy. In some cases, it is precisely these minilat-
eral formats – even if established outside the 
EU – that have led to the CFSP as a whole be-
ing further developed. The dialogue between 
Serbia and Kosovo and the Normandy format 
have shown that the whole EU can benefit 
when an informal group acts in foreign policy 
matters. Both have boosted European foreign 
policy by achieving concrete results and out-
puts, which in turn legitimizes the formats. 
“Sleeping beauties”  
in the treaty: Art. 31 (2)  
& Art. 32 (1) TEU
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There is good reason to consider taking action with 
smaller ad hoc groups. Member states define and 
perceive changes in global politics differently, and 
the incentives to work together differ widely. As 
long as such coalitions of the willing do not under-
mine the cohesion of the EU-27 or negatively affect 
EU measures taken in relation to the same issue, but 
rather work toward the attainment of the Union’s 
objectives, they can help to increase the visibility and 
credibility of the EU as an external actor. In cases of 
doubt, such as was initially the case with the Three 
Seas Initiative, the involvement of Commission Pres-
ident Juncker in informal initiatives has been an im-
portant step to build trust. The more foreign poli-
cy successes the EU achieves, the more confidence 
member states will have in the EU as a credible for-
eign policy actor. The successes of previous minilat-
eral formats speak for themselves.
Smaller member states in particular often have con-
cerns about being excluded from minilateral formats 
and dominated by large member states. It is there-
fore very important for large member states to re-
spect the sensibilities of smaller partners, taking an 
inclusive approach and being transparent. 
A good working method would be to discuss foreign 
policy objectives and strategy together in the Eu-
ropean Council and then task a coalition of willing-
and-able member states with their implementation. 
This might be particularly applicable in cases where 
interests of member states align, but priorities differ. 
The EU could also offer special “packages” (offering 
resources and tools) to back up member states’ en-
gagement. Another idea would be to apply the exam-
ple of the European Defense Fund to create new fi-
nancial instruments for foreign policy activities that 
would force different actors to work together in or-
der to get funding.
To this end, however, it would be necessary for the 
European Council to deal more closely with foreign 
policy issues than it has done to date. As nation-
al politicians, heads of state and government invest 
a considerable amount of their time and energy in 
foreign policy. But this is usually not reflected at the 
level of the European Council. There are many rea-
sons for this. Firstly, the current president of the Eu-
ropean Council, Donald Tusk, has not paid much at-
tention to foreign policy, and he certainly did not 
steer the debate on foreign policy issues in the Eu-
ropean Council strategically. Secondly, the distanced 
17 See also Blockmans, “Differentiation in CFSP: Potentials and Limits,” p. 11.
relationship between Tusk and Mogherini was not 
conducive to a stronger role for the European Coun-
cil in external relations. And thirdly, Mogherini did 
not make optimal use of the fact that she sat in all 
the meetings of the European Council. 
Next, Council President Charles Michel should seek 
to ensure that the European Council deals more 
strategically with foreign policy issues in the future. 
He should also seek a good relationship with the next 
HR/VP and explicitly ask him to make himself heard 
in the Council.
In order to increase the legitimacy of any ad hoc co-
alition, the willing member states should also bring 
a representative of the EU institutions to the table. 
This happened during the JCPOA negotiations with 
Iran, when the HR joined the E3. Another recent ex-
ample of this is French President Emmanuel Ma-
cron’s initiative to invite EU Commission President 
Juncker and German Chancellor Angela Merkel for 
talks with Chinese President  Xi  Jinping. This “piggy-
back” strategy should be used whenever possible to 
Europeanize and legitimize member states’ informal 
coalitions. Furthermore, the Commission’s and the 
EEAS’s potential to support such coalitions should be 
better explored and used. 
In the aftermath of Brexit, informal groups of states 
will continue to gain in importance. The EU will re-
main dependent on British diplomatic, military, and 
security policy abilities even after Brexit. If the EU 
is indeed to become a more assertive foreign pol-
icy player on the international stage, it also needs 
to offer attractive “docking mechanisms” to Great 
Britain, even if it is no longer an EU member state. 
One idea would be to allow the participation of Brit-
ish representatives, on an ad hoc basis, in meetings 
of the Foreign Affairs Council and other CFSP pro-
cesses.17 It is clearly in Britain’s and the EU member 
states’ mutual interest to continue working close-
Minilateral formats have 
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ly together in foreign, security, and defense poli-
cy. If the EU makes it too difficult to do so within 
EU structures, governments will find other formats 
that enable continued cooperation on an ad hoc ba-
sis in areas of mutual concern. For example, there 
is a strong consensus that the E3 format should be 
maintained, regardless of Brexit. 
Apply the “Barnier Method” to CFSP
If CFSP remains a domain primarily driven by mem-
ber states, there is a danger that it might be re-
duced to a clearinghouse for distinctly national per-
ceptions of geopolitics. Discussing how to create a 
stronger CFSP – one that is more than the extend-
ed arm of national foreign policies – presupposes 
that the member states are actually willing to sub-
ordinate their own national goals to a common Eu-
ropean goal and make the necessary compromises. 
In other words, that they are prepared to grant re-
al leadership to an actor that speaks and acts on be-
half of the EU. 
The Brexit negotiations serve as a role model for how 
such an approach can be successfully implemented, 
taking the interests of both the member states and 
institutions into account. The member states agreed 
on a common position in the European Council. Mi-
chel Barnier was selected as chief negotiator for 
the 27 EU member states, and he was able to speak 
on behalf of the EU. His task force coordinated the 
Commission’s work on all strategic, operational, le-
gal, and financial issues related to these negotiations. 
The EU member states were regularly informed 
of the status of negotiations and discussed further 
steps in the European Council. Member states re-
mained in the driver’s seat of the negotiations at all 
times. The result was a very strong negotiating posi-
tion for the EU. 
The chief negotiator of the EU might very well be 
the High Representative – but this is not mandatory. 
It would also be conceivable for the member states 
to agree on a representative by policy area, as long 
as this person enjoys the confidence of EU institu-
tions, in particular the Commission, and the mem-
ber states. What is crucial is a shared understanding 
of the foreign policy issue at hand and a joint posi-
tion regarding the goals and aims that the EU wants 
to achieve, as well as the member states’ willingness 
to delegate competences and trust. 
18 Nicolai von Ondarza, “A More Inward Looking European Union. The Structural Limits to a more Effective EU Foreign and Security Policy,” in Divided and 
Divisive. Europeans, Israel and Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking, ed. Muriel Asseburg and Nimrod Goren (Ramat Gan, 2019), p. 11 <https://www.mitvim.org.il/
images/Divided_and_Divisive_-_Europeans_Israel_and_Israeli-Palestinian_Peacemaking_-_Edited_by_Asseburg_and_Goren_-_May_2019.pdf> (accessed 
August 30, 2019).
Redefine the Role of the High Representative
At the beginning of Josep Borrell’s term as High Rep-
resentative of the EU, little remains of the expecta-
tions and enthusiasm associated with strengthen-
ing this position ten years ago.18 The full potential of 
the office has not yet been used – although Mogher-
ini was the first to have a fully functional EEAS. While 
Mogherini certainly preferred to manage rather than 
shape European foreign policy, the main reasons for 
this underperformance are twofold. First, there is an 
ongoing reluctance of member states to support a 
more active role and delegate meaningful foreign pol-
icy portfolios to the office of the High Representative. 
Member states simply don’t trust the High Represen-
tative and the EEAS to negotiate on their behalf. 
Second, while the High Representative – in his or 
her role as Vice-President of the European Com-
mission – is expected to coordinate the EU’s exter-
nal action, the position lacks the necessary authori-
ty vis-à-vis the Council and Commission. At present, 
the office sits between the chairs instead of bridging 
them. Constituting the new Commission, Ursula von 
der Leyen has avoided strengthening the position of 
the HR in the Commission’s hierarchy by not making 
Borrell an executive vice president. She has certain-
ly built on Juncker’s example and enabled Borrell to 
coordinate European foreign policy in his function as 
Vice-President of the Commission, as foreseen in the 
Lisbon Treaty. However, while he is supposed to en-
sure that all of the Commission’s work linked to de-
fense is coherent and consistent, he is not in charge 
of the new DG for Defense Industry and Space and 
the European Defense Fund. What is more, Borrell’s 
role in the implementation of sanctions was weak-
ened in favor of Valdis Dombrovskis’. 
There should therefore be realistic expectations 
from the outset that the future High Representative 
will have only limited influence and shaping pow-
er. Certainly, much will depend on how Borrell un-
Brexit negotiations  
as a role model
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derstands and fulfils his role. He may be able to lend 
more energy and charisma to European foreign pol-
icy in the future. He has considerably greater expe-
rience than Federica Mogherini and is known for not 
shying away from conflict. In Ursula von der Leyen, 
he certainly has a partner at the head of the Com-
mission for whom Europe’s ability to conduct foreign 
policy enjoys the highest priority and much will de-
pend on a good relationship between the two. Bor-
rell should further seek better relations with Charles 
Michel than prevailed between Mogherini and Don-
ald Tusk. Only if the President of the Commission 
and the President of the Council pull in the same 
direction and support him he can develop a strong 
position. 
In terms of work share, Josep Borrell should be 
tasked with a clear mandate from the member states 
to actually lead some important foreign policy port-
folios and negotiate on behalf of the Union, as in the 
case of Ashton and Mogherini with Iran. One of his 
first priorities should be to start working on a re-
vised follow-up document to the EU Global Strate-
gy, making sure that member states fully buy in this 
time around. More visible achievements for the High 
Representative would, above all, have a positive im-
pact on the public perception of European for-
eign policy as a whole and give it more legitimacy. 
NOT A QUESTION OF ABILITY, 
BUT ONLY OF WILL
The changing international environment and mount-
ing external challenges have given new momentum to 
further developing the EU’s Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy. Some EU member states – among them 
Germany and France – have recently re-emphasized 
the need to make progress and called for a more ef-
fective EU foreign policy. The new Commission Pres-
ident Ursula von der Leyen also supports a stronger 
role for the EU in foreign, security, and defense poli-
cy. Additionally, in its new strategic agenda for 2019–
2024, the European Council commits to making more 
resources available and to better using those the EU 
already has at its disposal. It is therefore important 
that words are now followed by actual deeds.
If the gap between big announcements and poor for-
eign policy performance persists, the EU’s foreign 
policy will lose its legitimacy. A clear majority of Eu-
ropeans would like the EU member states to act to-
19 See European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 89 (Spring 2018), p. 32 <http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2180_89_1_STD89_
ENG> (accessed August 30, 2019). 
gether on the international stage. In Eurobarometer 
surveys, around two thirds of respondents regular-
ly favor “a common foreign policy of the 28 member 
states of the EU.”19 The member states thus have a 
clear mandate from their citizens to push for a more 
effective EU foreign policy. If the impression is cre-
ated that “the EU does not deliver,” this will be fuel 
added to the fire for Euroskeptic forces.
If the EU really wants to play a greater internation-
al role in the future – de facto a precondition of its 
survival – it must organize itself better and act more 
coherently and effectively. The reasons that have 
so far prevented a proactive and coherent Europe-
an foreign policy are connected to the nature of for-
eign policy as a core element of national identity 
and sovereignty. They are also deeply rooted in the 
structural inconsistency of supranational and inter-
governmental elements in CFSP governance. Big in-
stitutional reforms, implying treaty changes, are cur-
rently not in the cards. Nor is it likely that member 
states will show an increased willingness to hand 
over significantly more sovereignty to Brussels. 
Useable instruments and methods that would im-
prove CFSP’s effectiveness and could be applied 
within the given operational framework are avail-
able, as this report has shown. At this point, the 
most promising way to push EU foreign policy for-
ward seems to be focusing on informal coalitions 
of smaller groups of states taking over foreign pol-
icy portfolios and seeking ways to make this benefi-
cial for the Union’s overall foreign policy. Creating a 
stronger CFSP – one that is more than the extended 
arm of national foreign policies – presupposes that 
the member states are actually willing to subordinate 
their own national goals to a common European goal 
and make the necessary compromises. 
If European leaders do not manage to come up with 
a strong collective response at least in the four cru-
cial policy areas identified – protecting multilateral-
ism, shoring up the transatlantic relationship, deal-
ing with a rising China, and catching up in the race 
for AI and new technologies – they will no longer be 
able to shape the world according to their preferenc-
es in the future.
Priorities for the EU’s New Foreign Policy Agenda up to 2024
18No. 1 | November 2019
ANALYSE
This paper is the result of a research project – 
funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
Finland and carried out by the German Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations (DGAP) – that aimed 
at f inding solutions to enhance the effective-
ness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) of the European Union. The analysis is 
based on the discussions during two workshops 
held by DGAP in partnership with the Policy 
Planning Staff of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Berlin and Helsinki in April and May 2019. 
I would like to thank the Finnish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, in particular Janne Jokinen, for 
their great support. I also would like to thank all 
speakers and participants for their valuable con-
tributions and input. I am particularly grateful for 
my think tank colleagues Sophia Besch, Giovanni 
Grevi, Christophe Hillion, Barbara Kunz, Tuomas 
Iso-Markku, Matti Pesu, Philip Rothmann, and 
Martin Quencez for sharing their insights. Nat-
urally, all responsibilities for the final paper lie 
with the author.
Rauchstraße 17/18 
10787 Berlin 
Tel. +49 30 25 42 31 -0 
info@dgap.org 
www.dgap.org 
 @dgapev
The German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP) is committed to fostering impactful 
foreign and security policy on a German and 
European level that promotes democracy, 
peace, and the rule of law. It is  nonpartisan 
and nonprofit. The opinions expressed in 
this publication are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of DGAP.
Publisher 
German Council on Foreign Relations
ISSN 1611-7034
Editing Helga Beck 
Layout Reiner Quirin 
Design Concept: WeDo
Author picture(s) © DGAP
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
 Attribution – NonCommercial – NoDerivatives 4.0 
 International License.
